This work provides an information-theoretic view to better understand the relationships between aggregated vulnerability information viewed by attackers and a class of randomized epidemic scanning algorithms. In particular, this work investigates three aspects: 1) a network vulnerability as the nonuniform vulnerable-host distribution, 2) threats, i.e., intelligent malwares that exploit such a vulnerability, and 3) defense, i.e., challenges for fighting the threats. We first study five large data sets and observe consistent clustered vulnerable-host distributions. We then present a new metric, referred to as the nonuniformity factor, that quantifies the unevenness of a vulnerable-host distribution. This metric is essentially the Renyi information entropy that unifies the nonuniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution with different malware-scanning methods. Next, we draw a relationship between Renyi entropies and randomized epidemic scanning algorithms. We find that the infection rates of malware-scanning methods are characterized by the Renyi entropies that relate to the information bits in a nonunform vulnerable-host distribution extracted by a randomized scanning algorithm. Meanwhile, we show that a representative network-aware malware can increase the spreading speed by exactly or nearly a nonuniformity factor when compared to a random-scanning malware at an early stage of malware propagation. This quantifies that how much more rapidly the Internet can be infected at the early stage when a malware exploits an uneven vulnerable-host distribution as a network-wide vulnerability. Furthermore, we analyze the effectiveness of defense strategies on the spread of network-aware malwares. Our results demonstrate that counteracting network-aware malwares is a significant challenge for the strategies that include host-based defenses and IPv6.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ALWARE attacks are a significant threat to networks.
Malwares are malicious software that include worms, viruses, bots, and spyware. A fundamental characteristic of malwares is self-propagation, i.e., a malware can infect vulnerable hosts and use infected hosts to self-disseminate. A key component of malware propagation is malware-scanning methods, i.e., how effectively the malware finds vulnerable targets. Most of Manuscript received January 06, 2009; revised May 18, 2009 . First published June 30, 2009 ; current version published August 14, 2009 . This work was supported in part by NSF ECS 0300605. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Robert H. Deng.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2009.2025847 the real, especially old worms, such as Code Red [19] , Slammer [18] , and latter Witty [25] , use naive random scanning (RS) [6] . RS chooses target IP addresses uniformly and does not take any information on network structures into consideration. Advanced scanning methods, however, have been developed that exploit the IP address structure. For example, Code Red II [34] and Nimda [33] worms have used localized scanning (LS) [5] . LS preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the local subnetwork. The Blaster worm [36] has used sequential scanning in addition to LS [31] . Sequential scanning searches for vulnerable hosts through their closeness in the IP address space. Moreover, the AgoBot has employed a blacklist of the well-known monitored IP address space and avoided scanning these addresses to be stealthy [39] . The Samy worm has developed to make use of "friendship" in social networks to propagate across the MySpace site [40] . A common characteristic of these malwares is that they scan for vulnerable hosts by exploiting a certain structure in the IP address space. Such a structure, as we shall soon show, exhibits network vulnerabilities to defenders and advantages to attackers.
In this paper, we study the perspective of attackers who attempt to collect the information on network vulnerabilities and design intelligent malwares. By studying this perspective, we hope to help defenders better understand malware spreading, e.g., the worst as well as practical malwares that utilize a certain class of randomized scanning algorithms, and better defend against malware attacks.
For attackers, an open question is how certain information can help them design fast-spreading malwares. The information can be from coarse to fine, including the number of vulnerable hosts, a distribution of vulnerable hosts, the locations of detection systems, and individual vulnerable hosts. This work focuses on aggregated information, i.e., vulnerable-host distributions. The vulnerable-host distributions have been observed to be bursty and spatially inhomogeneous by Barford et al. [1] . A nonuniform distribution of Witty-worm victims has been reported by Rajab et al. [21] . A web-server distribution has been found to be nonuniform in the IP address space in our prior work [8] . These discoveries suggest that vulnerable hosts and web servers may be "clustered" (i.e., nonuniform). The clustering/nonuniformity makes the network vulnerable since if one host is compromised in a cluster, the rest may be compromised rather quickly. Therefore, the information on vulnerable-host distributions can be critical for attackers to develop intelligent malwares.
We refer the malwares that exploit the information on the highly uneven distributions of vulnerable hosts as network-aware malwares. Such malwares include aforementioned localized-scanning and sequential-scanning malwares. In our prior work, we have studied importance-scanning malwares [8] , [10] , [15] . Specifically, importance scanning (IS) provides a worst-case ("what-if") scenario: When there are many ways for network-aware malwares to exploit the information on vulnerable hosts, IS is a worst-case threat-model and can serve as a benchmark for studying real malwares. Indeed, what has been observed is that real network-aware and importance-scanning malwares spread much faster than random-scanning malwares [8] , [21] . However, it is not well understood how to characterize the relationship between the information on vulnerable-host distributions possessed by attackers and the propagation speed of network-aware malwares.
Questions arise. Does a generic characteristic exist across different vulnerable-host distributions? If so, how do networkaware malwares exploit such a vulnerability? How can we defend against such malwares? Our goal is to investigate such a generic characteristic in vulnerable-host distributions, to quantify its relationship with network-aware malwares, and to understand the effectiveness of defense strategies. To achieve this goal, we investigate network-aware malware attacks in view of information theory, focusing on both the worst-case and real network-aware malwares.
A fundamental concept of information theory is the entropy that measures the uncertainty of outcomes of a random event. The reduction of uncertainty is measured by the amount of acquired information. We apply the Renyi entropy, a generalized entropy [23] , to analyze the uncertainty of finding vulnerable hosts for different malware-scanning methods. As we shall soon show, the Renyi entropy is unique in relating three factors: malware-scanning methods, the information bits extracted by malwares from the vulnerable-host distribution, and malware spreading speed.
As the first step, we observe, from five large-scale measurement sets, the common characteristics of nonuniform vulnerable-host distributions. We then derive a new metric as the nonuniformity factor to characterize the nonuniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution. A larger nonuniformity factor reflects a more nonuniform distribution of vulnerable hosts. We obtain the nonuniformity factors from the data sets on vulnerable-host distributions and show that all data sets have large nonuniformity factors. Moreover, the nonuniformity factor is a function of the Renyi entropies of order two and zero [23] . We show that the nonuniformity factor better characterizes the unevenness of a distribution than the Shannon entropy. Therefore, in view of information theory, the nonuniformity factor provides a quantitative measure of the unevenness/uncertainty of a vulnerable-host distribution.
Next, we relate the generalized entropy with network-aware scanning methods. The class of network-aware malwares that we study all utilizes randomized epidemic algorithms. Hence the importance of applying the generalized entropy is that the Renyi entropy characterizes the bits of information extractable by the randomized epidemic algorithms. We develop explicit relations among the Renyi entropy, the randomized epidemic scanning methods, and the spreading speed of network-aware malwares at an early stage of propagation. A malware that spreads faster at the early stage can in general infect most of the vulnerable hosts in a shorter time. The propagation ability of a malware at the early stage is characterized by the infection rate [32] . We derive the infection rates of a class of network-aware malwares. We find that the infection rates of random-scanning and network-aware malwares are determined by the uncertainty of the vulnerable-host distribution or the Renyi entropies of different orders. Specifically, a random-scanning malware has the largest uncertainty (i.e., Renyi entropy of order zero), and an optimal importance-scanning malware has the smallest uncertainty (i.e., Renyi entropy with order infinity). Moreover, the infection rates of some real network-aware malwares depend on the nonuniformity factors or the Renyi entropy of order two. For example, compared with RS, LS can increase the infection rate by nearly a nonuniformity factor. Therefore, the infection rates of malware-scanning algorithms are characterized by the Renyi entropies, relating the efficiency of a randomized scanning algorithm with the uncertainty on a nonuniform vulnerable-host distribution. These analytical results on the relationships between vulnerable-host distributions and network-aware malware spreading ability are validated by simulation.
Finally, we study new challenges to malware defenses posed by network-aware malwares. Using the nonuniformity factor, we show quantitatively that the host-based defense strategies, such as proactive protection (PP) [3] and virus throttling (VT) [27] , should be deployed at almost all hosts to slow down network-aware malwares at the early stage. A partial deployment may invalidate such host-based defenses. Moreover, we demonstrate that the infection rate of a network-aware malware in the IPv6 Internet can be comparable to that of the Code Red v2 worm in the IPv4 Internet. This shows that having a much larger IP-address space would not alleviate malware spreading.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides the background on information theory. Section III presents our collected data sets. Section IV introduces a new metric called the nonuniformity factor and compares this metric to the Shannon entropy. Sections V and VI characterize the spreading ability of network-aware malwares through theoretical analyses and simulations. Section VII further studies the effectiveness of defense strategies on network-aware malwares. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. RENYI ENTROPY
An entropy is a measure of the average information uncertainty of a random variable [13] . A general entropy, called the Renyi entropy [4] , [23] , is defined as for (1) where the random variable is with probability distribution and alphabet . The well-known Shannon entropy is a special case of the Renyi entropy, i.e.,
It is noted that
where is the alphabet size, and
where is a result from and is called the min-entropy of . In this paper, moreover, we are also interested in the Renyi entropy of order two, i.e.,
Comparing , , , and , we have the following theorem that has been proved in [4] and [22] .
Theorem 1:
with equality iff is uniformly distributed over .
III. MEASUREMENTS AND VULNERABLE-HOST DISTRIBUTIONS
We begin our study by considering how significant the unevenness of vulnerable-host distributions is. We use five large data sets to obtain empirical vulnerable-host distributions.
A. Measurements
DShield (D1): DShield provides the information of vulnerable hosts by aggregating logs from more than 1600 intrusion detection systems (IDSes) distributed throughout the Internet [35] . We further focus on the following ports that were attacked by worms: 80 (HTTP), 135 (DCE/RPC), 445 (Net-BIOS/SMB), 1023 (FTP servers and the remote shell attacked by W32.Sasser.E.Worm), and 6129 (DameWare).
iSinks (P1 and C1): Two unused address space monitors run the iSink system [29] . The monitors record the unwanted traffic arriving at the unused address spaces that include a Class A network (referred to as "Provider" or P1) and two Class B networks at the campus of the University of Wisconsin (referred to as "Campus" or C1) [1] .
Witty-worm victims (W1): A list of Witty-worm victims is provided by CAIDA [25] . CAIDA used a network telescope with approximate IP addresses to log the traffic of Wittyworm victims that are Internet security systems (ISS) products.
Web-server list (W2): The IP addresses of web servers were collected through UROULETTE [38] . UROULETTE provides a random uniform resource locator (URL) generator to obtain a list of IP addresses of web servers.
The first three data sets (D1, P1, and C1) were collected over a seven-day period from 12/10/2004 to 12/16/2004 and have been studied in [1] to demonstrate the bursty and spatially inhomogeneous distribution of malicious source IP addresses. The last two data sets (W1 and W2) have been used in our prior work [8] to show the virulence of importance-scanning malwares. The summary of our data sets is given in Table I .
B. Vulnerable-Host Distributions
To obtain vulnerable-host group distributions, we use the classless interdomain routing (CIDR) notation [17] . The Internet is partitioned into subnets according to the first bits of IP addresses, i.e., prefixes or subnets. In this division, there are subnets, and each subnet contains addresses, 
where
. For example, when , the Internet is grouped into Class A subnets ( i.e., /8 subnets); when , the Internet is partitioned into Class B subnets (i.e., /16 subnets).
We plot the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of our collected data sets in /8 and /16 subnets in Fig. 1 in log-log scales. CCDF is defined as the fraction of the subnets with the number of hosts greater than a given value. Fig. 1 (a) shows population distributions in /8 subnets for D1, P1, C1, W1, and W2, whereas Fig. 1 (b) exhibits host distributions in /16 subnets for D1 with different ports (80, 135, 445, 1023, and 6129). Fig. 1 demonstrates a wide range of populations, indicating highly inhomogeneous address structures. Specifically, the relatively straight lines, such as W2 and D1-135, imply that vulnerable hosts follow a power law distribution. Similar observations were given in [1] , [8] , [9] , [11] , [18] - [21] , [28] , and [42] - [44] .
IV. NONUNIFORMITY FACTOR
In this section, we derive a simple metric, called the nonuniformity factor, to quantify the vulnerability, i.e., the nonuniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution. We show that the nonuniformity factor is a function of Renyi entropies. We then compare the nonuniformity factor with the well-known Shannon entropy.
A. Definition and Property
We consider aggregated vulnerable-host distributions. Let be an aggregation level of IP addresses as defined in Section III-B. For a given , let be the number of vulnerable hosts in subnet , where . Let be the total number of vulnerable hosts, where . Let be the probability that a randomly chosen vulnerable host is in the th subnet. Then ; and
. Thus, 's denote the group distribution of vulnerable hosts in subnets.
Definition: The nonuniformity factor in subnets is defined as (7) Note that such a definition is not arbitrary. In Section V, is used to unify the analytical results on the infection speeds of different malware-scanning strategies.
One property of is that
The above inequality is derived by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The equality holds if and only if , for . In other words, when the vulnerable-host distribution is uniform, achieves the minimum value 1. On the other hand, since , 
where . The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in [7] . An intuitive explanation of this theorem is as follows. For and subnets, group of subnets is partitioned into groups and of subnets. If vulnerable hosts in each group of subnets are equally divided into the groups of subnets (i.e., ), then . If the division of vulnerable hosts is extremely uneven for all groups (i.e., or ), then . Excluding these two extreme cases, . Therefore, is a nondecreasing function of . Moreover, the ratio of to reflects how unevenly vulnerable hosts in each subnet distribute between two groups of subnets. This ratio is indicated by the slope of in a figure. Fig. 2 shows the nonuniformity factors estimated from our data sets. The nonuniformity factors increase with the prefix length for all data sets. Note that the -axis is in a scale. Thus, increases almost exponentially with a wide range of . To gain intuition on how large can be, and are summarized for all data sets in Table II . It can be observed that and have large values, indicating the significant unevenness of collected distributions.
B. Estimated Nonuniformity Factor

C. Shannon Entropy
To further understand the importance of the nonuniformity factor, we now turn our attention on the Shannon entropy for comparison. It is well-known that the Shannon entropy can be used to measure the nonuniformity of a probability distribution [13] . The Shannon entropy in subnets is defined as (14) where . It is noted that
If a distribution is uniform, achieves the maximum value . On the other hand, if a distribution is extremely nonuniform, e.g., all vulnerable hosts concentrate on one subnet, obtains the minimum value 0. Furthermore, we compare with and find that their difference is between 0 and 1, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
where . The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in [7] . Fig. 3 shows the Shannon entropies of our empirical distributions from the data sets.
is denoted by the diagonal line in the figure. It can be seen that the curves for our collected data sets are similar.
D. Nonuniformity Factor, Renyi Entropy, and Shannon Entropy
To quantify the difference between the nonuniformity factor and the Shannon entropy, we note that the nonuniformity factor directly relates to the Renyi entropies of order two and zero, as shown in the following equation: (17) where
. Therefore, the nonuniformity factor is essentially a Renyi entropy. Hence, the nonuniformity factor corresponds to a generalized entropy of order 2, whereas the Shannon entropy is the generalized entropy of order 1.
Why do we choose the nonuniformity factor rather than the Shannon entropy? We compare these two metrics in terms of characterizing a vulnerable-host distribution and find the following fundamental differences. First, in Fig. 2 , when a distribution is uniform, . Hence, the distance between and the horizontal access 1 measures the degree of unevenness. Similarly, the distance between and 0 in Fig. 3 reflects how uniform a distribution is. A larger corresponds to a more even distribution, whereas a larger corresponds to a more nonuniform distribution. In addition, if two distributions have different prefix lengths, we can directly apply the nonuniformity factor (or the Shannon entropy) to compare the unevenness (or evenness) between them. Therefore, the Shanon entropy provides a better measure for describing the evenness of a distribution, while the nonuniformity factor gives a better metric for characterizing the nonuniformity of a distribution. Second, from Theorem 1 and (17), we have when the nonzero 's are not all equal. Meanwhile, evidenced by Figs. 2 and 3 , the nonuniformity factor magnifies the unevenness of a distribution. Therefore, depends more on the large 's. Finally, a more important aspect of using the nonuniformity factor is its relation to some real randomized epidemic algorithms (e.g., LS and sequential scanning). Such a relationship cannot be drawn using the Shannon entropy but can be related to Renyi entropies and thus information bits.
V. INFORMATION BITS AND NETWORK-AWARE MALWARE SPREADING
In this section, we explicitly relate the speed of malware propagation with the information bits extracted by random-scanning and network-aware malwares.
A. Collision Probability, Uncertainty, and Information Bits
Now consider a malware or an adversary that searches for vulnerable hosts. An adversary often does not have the complete knowledge on the locations of vulnerable hosts. Hence, malwares make a random guess on which subnets are likely to have most vulnerable hosts. This results in a class of randomized epidemic algorithms for malwares to scan subnets. Let be the probability that a malware scans the th subnet. Thus, 's characterize the virulence of randomized epidemic scanning algorithms.
We then define three important quantities: the collision probability, uncertainty, and information bits. Consider a randomly chosen vulnerable host . The probability that this host is in the subnet is . Imagine that a malware guesses which subnet host belongs to and chooses a target subnet with the probability . Thus, the probability for the malware to make a correct guess is . This probability is called the collision probability and is defined in [4] . Such a probability of success is reflected in our designed nonuniformity factor and corresponds to a scenario that the malware knows the underlying vulnerable-host group distribution. Intuitively, the more nonuniform a vulnerable-host distribution is, the larger the probability of success is, i.e., the easier it is for a scan to hit a vulnerable host, the more vulnerable the network is, and the less uncertainty there is in a vulnerable-host distribution.
We now extend the concept of the collision probability and define as the probability that a malware scan hits a subnet where a randomly chosen vulnerable host locates, i.e.,
Then two important quantities can be defined:
• as the uncertainty exhibited by the vulnerablehost distribution 's. • as the number of information bits extracted by a randomized epidemic scanning algorithm using 's. Here is regarded as the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution in view of the malware, similar to self-information [41] . For example, if a malware has no information about a vulnerable-host distribution and has to use RS, it has the largest uncertainty and extracts zero information bits from the distribution. Likewise, the number of information bits extracted by a network-aware malware can be measured as the reduction of the uncertainty and thus equal to . For example, is the information bits extractable by an adversary that chooses .
B. Infection Rate
We characterize the spread of a network-aware malware at an early stage by deriving the infection rate. The infection rate, denoted by , is defined as the average number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the early stage of malware propagation [32] . The infection rate is an important metric for studying network-aware malware spreading ability for two reasons. First, since the number of infected hosts increases exponentially with the rate during the early stage, a malware with a higher infection rate can spread much faster at the beginning and thus infect a large number of hosts in a shorter time [8] . Second, while it is generally difficult to derive a close-form solution for dynamic malware propagation, we can obtain a close-form expression of the infection rate for different malware scanning methods.
Let denote the (random) number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the early stage of malware propagation. The infection rate is the expected value of , i.e.,
. Let be the scanning rate or the number of scans sent by an infected host per unit time, be the number of vulnerable hosts, and be the scanning space (i.e., ).
C. Random Scanning
RS has been used by most real worms and is the simplest randomized epidemic algorithm. For RS, an infected host sends out random scans per unit time, and the probability that one scan hits a vulnerable host is . Thus, follows a Binomial distribution , 1 resulting in (19) Another way to derive the infection rate of RS is as follows. Consider a randomly chosen vulnerable host . The probability that this host is in the subnet is . An RS malware can make a successful guess on which subnet host belongs to with collision probability . A scan from the RS malware can be regarded as first selecting the subnet randomly and then choosing the host in the subnet at random. Hence the probability for the malware to hit host is . Since there are vulnerable hosts, the probability for a malware to hit a vulnerable host is . Thus, follows a Binomial distribution , resulting in (20) Therefore, for the RS malware, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution is , i.e., the number of information bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by RS is .
D. Optimal IS
IS exploits the nonuniform distribution of vulnerable hosts. In our prior work, we showed that IS corresponds to the worst-case malware attacks given a vulnerable-host distribution [8] . In this work, we derive the infection rate of IS and relate that to information bits. An infected host scans subnet with the probability . Consider a randomly chosen vulnerable host . The probability for this host being in subnet is . An IS malware can make a successful guess on which subnet host belongs to with collision probability . Thus, the probability for the malware to hit the host is . Similar to RS, of IS follows 1 In our derivation, we ignore the dependency of the events that different scans hit the same target at the early stage of malware propagation. a Binomial distribution , which leads to 2 (21) Therefore, the uncertainty of the vulnerable-host distribution for an IS malware is , and the number of information bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by IS is . Note that IS can choose 's to maximize the infection rate, resulting in a "worst-case" scenario for defenders or optimal IS ( OPT_IS) for attackers [8] , i.e., (22) That is, (23) Therefore, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution for OPT_IS is ; and the number of information bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by this scanning method is .
E. Suboptimal IS
As shown in our prior work [8] , the optimal IS is difficult to implement in reality. Hence we consider a special case of IS, where the group scanning distribution is chosen to be proportional to the number of vulnerable hosts in group , i.e.,
. This results in suboptimal IS [8] , called IS. Thus, the infection rate derived in this work is (24) Therefore, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution for IS is ; and the corresponding number of information bits extracted is or . Moreover, compared with RS, this IS can increase the infection rate by a factor of . On the other hand, RS can be regarded as a special case of suboptimal IS when .
F. Localized Scanning
LS has been used by such real worms as Code Red II and Nimda. LS is a simpler randomized algorithm that utilizes only a few parameters rather than an underlying vulnerable-host group distribution. We first consider a simplified version of LS, called LS, which scans the Internet as follows: • of the time, an address with the same first bits is chosen as the target; • of the time, an address is chosen randomly from an entire IP address space.
Hence, LS is an oblivious yet local randomized algorithm where the locality is characterized by parameter . Assume that an initially infected host is randomly chosen from the vulnerable hosts. Let denote the subnet where an initially infected host locates. Thus, , where . For an infected host located in subnet , a scan from this host probes globally with the probability of and hits subnet with the likelihood of . Thus, the group scanning distribution for this host is if otherwise (25) where . Given the subnet location of an initially infected host (i.e., subnet ), the conditional collision probability or the probability for a malware scan to hit a subnet where a randomly chosen vulnerable host locates can be calculated based on (18), i.e., (26) Therefore, we can compute the collision probability as (27) resulting in (28) Therefore, the number of information bits extracted from the vulnerable-host distribution by LS is , which is between 0 and . Moreover, since ( is for a uniform distribution and is excluded here), increases with respect to . Specifically, when , . Thus, LS has an infection rate comparable to that of IS. In reality, cannot be 1. This is because an LS malware begins spreading from one infected host that is specifically in a subnet; and if , the malware can never spread out of this subnet. Therefore, we expect that the optimal value of should be large but not 1.
Next, we further consider another LS, called two-level LS (2LLS), which has been used by the Code Red II and Nimda worms [33] , [34] . 2LLS scans the Internet as follows:
• of the time, an address with the same first byte is chosen as the target; • of the time, an address with the same first two bytes is chosen as the target; • of the time, a random address is chosen. For example, for the Code Red II worm, and [34] ; for the Nimda worm, and [33] . Using the similar analysis for LS, we can derive the infection rate of 2LLS (29) Similarly, the number of information bits extracted from the vulnerable-host distribution by the 2LLS malware is , which is between 0 and .
Since from Theorem 2, holds or increases when both and increase. Specially, when , . Thus, 2LLS has an infection rate comparable to that of /16 IS. Moreover, is much larger than as shown in Table II for the collected distributions. Hence, is more significant than for 2LLS.
G. Modified Sequential Scanning
The Blaster worm is a real malware that exploits sequential scanning in combination with LS. A sequential-scanning malware studied in [16] , [31] begins to scan addresses sequentially from a randomly chosen starting IP address and has a similar propagation speed as a random-scanning malware. The Blaster worm selects its starting point locally as the first address of its Class C subnet with probability 0.4 [31] , [36] . To analyze the effect of sequential scanning, we do not incorporate LS. Specifically, we consider our modified sequential-scanning (MSS) malware, which scans the Internet as follows:
• Newly infected host begins with RS until finding a vulnerable host with address . • After infecting the target , host continues to sequentially scan IP addresses in the subnet where locates. Such a sequential malware-scanning strategy is in a similar spirit to the nearest neighbor rule, which is widely used in pattern classification [12] . The basic idea is that if the vulnerable hosts are clustered, the neighbor of a vulnerable host is likely to be vulnerable also.
Such a MSS malware has two stages. In the first stage (called MSS_1), the malware uses RS and has an infection rate of , i.e., . In the second stage (called MSS_2), the malware scans sequentially in a subnet. The fist bits of a target address are fixed, whereas the last bits of the address are generated additively or subtractively and are modulated by . Let denote the sunbet where locates. Thus, , where . Since an MSS_2 malware scans only the subnet where locates, the conditional collision probability , which leads to . Thus, the infection rate is
Therefore, the uncertainty on vulnerable hosts for MSS is between and . Moreover, the infection rate of MSS is between and .
H. Summary
The information bits extractable by the network-aware malwares relates the entropy on a vulnerable-host distribution and the malware propagation speed, as shown in the following equation: (31) where is the collision probability and is the infection rate of the malware .  TABLE III  UNCERTAINTY ON THE VULNERABLE-HOST DISTRIBUTION, INFORMATION BITS, AND INFECTION RATES OF DIFFERENT SCANNING METHODS   When subnets are considered, RS has the largest uncertainty , while optimal IS has the smallest uncertainty
. Moreover, infection rates of all three network-aware malwares (suboptimal IS, LS, and MSS) can be far larger than that of an RS malware, depending on the nonuniformity factors (i.e., ) or the Renyi entropy in the order of two (i.e.,
). The infection rates of all these scanning algorithms are characterized by the Renyi entropies, relating the efficiency of a randomized scanning algorithm with the information bits in a vulnerable-host distribution.
Hence, we relate the information theory with the network-aware malware propagation through the Renyi entropy. The uncertainty of a vulnerable-host group probability distribution, which is quantified by the Renyi entropy, is important for an attacker to design a network-aware malware. If there is no uncertainty about the distribution of vulnerable hosts (e.g., either all vulnerable hosts are concentrated on a subnet or all information about vulnerable hosts is known), the entropy is minimum, and the malware that uses the information on the distribution can spread fastest by employing the optimal IS. On the other hand, if there is maximum uncertainty (e.g., vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed), the entropy is maximum. For this case, the best strategy that a malware can take is to use RS. In general, when an attacker obtains more information about a nonuniform vulnerable-host distribution (e.g., larger ), the resulting malware can spread faster.
VI. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
We now validate our analytical results through simulations using the collected data sets.
A. Infection Rate
We first focus on validating infection rates. We apply the discrete event simulation to our experiments [24] . Specifically, we simulate the searching process of a malware using different scanning methods at the early stage. We use the C1 data set for the vulnerable-host distribution. Note that the C1 distribution has the nonuniformity factors and , and . The malware spreads over the C1 distribution with and has a scanning rate . The uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution and the information bits extractable for different scanning methods are shown in Table III , whereas a 2LLS malware employs and . We observe that the sample means and the analytical results are almost identical.
We observe that network-aware malwares have much larger infection rates than random-scanning malwares. LS indeed increases the infection rate with nearly a nonuniformity factor and approaches the capacity of suboptimal IS. This is significant as LS only depends on one or two parameters (i.e., for LS and , for 2LLS), while IS requires the information of the vulnerable-host distribution. On the other hand, LS has a larger sample variance than IS as indicated by Table III . This implies that the infection speed of an LS malware depends on the location of initially infected hosts. If the LS malware begins spreading from a subnet containing densely populated vulnerable hosts, the malware would spread rapidly. Furthermore, we notice that the MSS malware also has a large infection rate at the second stage, indicating that MSS can indeed exploit the clustering pattern of the distribution. Meanwhile, the large sample variance of the infection rate of MSS_2 reflects that an MSS malware strongly depends on the initially infected hosts. We further compute the infection rate of a /16 MSS malware that includes both random-scanning and sequential-scanning stages. Simulation results are averaged over runs and are summarized in Table IV . These results strongly depend on the total number of malware scans. When the number of malware scans is small, an MSS malware behaves similar to a random-scanning malware. When the number of malware scans increases, the MSS malware spends more scans on the second stage and thus has a larger infection rate.
B. Dynamic Malware Propagation
An infection rate only characterizes the early stage of malware propagation. We now employ the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model and its extensions to characterize the entire spreading process of malwares [6] . Specifically, the spread of RS and IS malwares is implemented as described in [8] , whereas the propagation of LS malwares is modeled according to [21] . The parameters that we use to simulate a malware are comparable to those of the Code Red v2 worm. Code Red v2 has a vulnerable population and a scanning rate per minute [30] . We assume that the malware begins spreading from an initially infected host that is located in the subnet containing the largest number of vulnerable hosts. We show the propagation speeds of network-aware malwares for the same vulnerable-host distribution from data set D1-80. From Section V, we expect that a network-aware malware can spread much faster than an RS malware. Fig. 4 
VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE STRATEGIES
What are new requirements and challenges for a defense system to slow down the spread of a network-aware malware?
We conduct an initial study on the effectiveness of defense strategies through nonuniformity factors.
A. Host-Based Defenses
Host-based defenses have been widely used for random-scanning malwares. PP and VT are examples of host-based defense strategies. A PP strategy proactively hardens a system, making it difficult for a malware to exploit vulnerabilities [3] . Techniques used by PP include address-space randomization, pointer encryption, instruction-set randomization, and password protection. Thus, a malware requires multiple trials to compromise a host that implements PP. Specifically, let denote the protection probability or the probability that a single malware attempt succeeds in infecting a vulnerable host that implements PP. On the average, a malware should make exploit attempts to compromise the target. We assume that hosts with PP are uniformly deployed in the Internet. Let denote the deployment ratio of the number of hosts with PP to the total number of hosts.
To show the effectiveness of the PP strategy, we consider the infection rate of a IS malware. Since now some of the vulner-able hosts implement PP, (24) changes to (32) To slow down the spread of a suboptimal IS malware to that of a random-scanning malware, , resulting in (33) When PP is fully deployed, i.e., , can be at most . On the other hand, if PP provides perfect protection, i.e., , should be at least . Therefore, when is large, inequality (33) presents high requirements for the PP strategy. For example, if (most of 's in Table II are larger than this value), and . That is, a PP strategy should be almost fully deployed and provide a nearly perfect protection for a vulnerable host.
We next consider the VT strategy [27] . VT constrains the number of outgoing connections of a host and can thus reduce the scanning rate of an infected host. We find that (32) also holds for this strategy, except that is the ratio of the scanning rate of infected hosts with VT to that of infected hosts without VT. Therefore, VT also requires to be almost fully deployed for fighting network-aware malwares effectively.
From these two strategies, we have learned that an effective strategy should reduce either or . Host-based defenses, however, are limited in such capabilities.
B. IPv6
IPv6 can decrease significantly by increasing the scanning space [32] . But the nonuniformity factor would increase the infection rate if the vulnerable-host distribution is still nonuniform. Hence, an important question is whether IPv6 can counteract network-aware malwares when both and are taken into consideration.
We study this issue by computing the infection rate of a network-aware malware in the IPv6 Internet. As pointed out by [2] , a smart malware can first detect some vulnerable hosts in /64 subnets containing many vulnerable hosts, then release to the hosts on the hitlist, and finally spread inside these subnets. Such a malware only scans the local /64 subnet. Thus, we focus on the spreading speed of a network-aware malware in a /64 subnet. From Fig. 2 , we extrapolate that in the IPv6 Internet can be in the order of if hosts are still distributed in a clustered fashion. Using the parameters proposed by [14] and used by the Slammer worm [18] , we derive the infection rate of a /32 IS malware in a /64 subnet of the IPv6 Internet:
. is larger than the infection rate of the Code Red v2 worm in the IPv4 Internet, where . Therefore, IPv6 can only slow down the spread of a network-aware malware to that of a random-scanning malware in IPv4. To defend against the malware effectively, we should further consider how to slow down the increase rate of as increases when IPv4 is updated to IPv6.
C. Discussions
Defending against network-aware malwares is challenging also due to the unknown causes of vulnerable-host distributions. That is why the vulnerable-host distribution is highly nonuniform in the IPv4 address space. An answer to this question would involve other studies that are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, we hypothesize several possible reasons. First, no vulnerable hosts can exist in reserved or multicast address ranges [37] . Second, different subnet administrators may make different use of their own IP address space. For example, an administrator may intend to use NATs extensively, whereas another administrator would consider to distribute the global IP addresses first. Third, a subnet intends to have many computers with the same operating systems and applications for easy management [6] , [26] . Last, some subnets are more protected than others [1] , [21] . Studying these issues may provide insights on new defense strategies, which can be considered as a future direction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have derived a simple metric, known as the nonuniformity factor, to quantify an uneven distribution of vulnerable hosts. The nonuniformity factor, shown as a function of the Renyi entropies of order two and zero, better characterizes the uneven feature of a distribution than the Shannon entropy. Moreover, we have drawn a relationship between Renyi entropies and randomized epidemic scanning algorithms. Specifically, we have related the information bits extracted by malwares from a vulnerable-host distribution with the propagation speed of network-aware malwares. Furthermore, we have evaluated the effectiveness of several commonly used defense strategies on network-aware malwares. The host-based defenses, such as PP or VT, are required to be almost fully deployed to slow down malware spreading at the early stage. This implies that host-based defenses would be weakened significantly by network-aware scanning. More surprisingly, different from previous findings, we have shown that network-aware malwares can be zero-day malwares in the IPv6 Internet if vulnerable hosts are still clustered. These findings present a significant challenge to malware defenses: Entirely different strategies may be needed for fighting network-aware malwares.
As part of our ongoing work, we plan to study in more depth relationships between information theory and dynamic malware attacks and develop effective detection and defense systems that exploit vulnerable-host distributions.
